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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby
conferring jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Utah Code section 78a-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration1 of covenants,

conditions and restrictions for Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch was void ab initio.
Standard of Review: Whether a party complied with the terms of a contract is a
question of fact, reviewed for clear error. Saudners v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence"
are matters of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, N.A. v. Nat 7
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988).
Preservation of Issue: The Association2 does not dispute that Sky Ranch3 preserved
this issue below.

1

As used herein, the "2002 Declaration" shall refer to the Second Restated
Supplementary and Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions for
Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch, a Planned Development in Washington County, Utah. R. 3 7 5 a,
Ex.6.
2

As used herein, the "Association" shall refer to Plaintiff/Appellee Grassy Meadows
Sky Ranch Landowners Association.
3

As used herein,"Sky Ranch" shall refer to Defendant/Appellee Grassy Meadows
Airport, Inc.; Sky Ranch
Development, Inc.; and Michael O. Longley, collectively.
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2.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch's claim for tortious

interference failed as a matter of law.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly granted judgment as a matter
of law is reviewed for correctness. Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, ^f 6, 197 P.3d 650.
Preservation of Issue: The Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved
this issue below.
3.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was not entitled to

terminate the Airport Lease Agreement based upon the evidence presented at trial.
Standard of Review: Whether a party complied with the terms of a contract is a
question of fact, reviewed for clear error. Saudners, 793 P.2d at 931.
Preservation of Issue: The Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved
this issue below.
4.

Whether the trial court properly adjudicated the entirety of Sky Ranch's breach

of contract claim, including its allegation that the Association had failed to pay certain lease
payments.
Standard of Review: Whether an issue is properly before the trial court is a question
of law, reviewed for correctness. Lee v. Sanders, 2002 UT App 281, If 6, 55 P.3d 1127.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was not raised in Sky Ranch's docketing statement,
but the Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved it below.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions or determinative statutes that are determinative
or of central importance to the issues raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
At its core, this case is about retaliation. This case arises out of Sky Ranch's desire

to retake control over the airstrip it had leased to the Association and transform the Grassy
Meadows development, a sleepy community surrounding a private and restricted airstrip
nestled in a remote area of Hurricane, Utah, into a bustling hub of commercial activity. For
more than a decade, Sky Ranch, as the developer of Grassy Meadows, and the Association,
comprising the homeowners and landowners of Grassy Meadows, coexisted peacefully. Sky
Ranch leased the airstrip, which it had constructed to be the centerpiece of the community,
to the Association, and, in return, the Association maintained it in good operating condition.
See Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Airport Lease Agreement ("Lease"), R. 375a, Ex. 1.
Then, in approximately 2002, Sky Ranch began to take steps that would radically alter
and forever change the nature of the community. Sky Ranch had grand plans to expand the
"Fixed Base Operations" at the airstrip to include restaurants, stores, maintenance facilities
and even hotels to cater to a greatly expanded number of authorized airport users flying a
greatly expanded category of authorized aircraft. To accomplish this transformation, Sky
Ranch unilaterally filed and recorded a new declaration of covenants, conditions and
restrictions, which disenfranchised the Association, allowing Sky Ranch to effect these
changes in the community unchecked.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Concerned about Sky Ranch's unabashed power-grab and the radical changes the new
declaration would cause to the nature of their quiet community, and believing Sky Ranch no
longer had the authority to amend the declaration unilaterally, the Association challenged the
declaration's validity. The Association and its members also resisted Sky Ranch's efforts to
change zoning ordinances to effect its plan. Irate at the Association's opposition to its efforts
to overhaul the community and retake control of the airstrip, Sky Ranch sent the Association
a notice of its intent to terminate the Lease. The notice alleged that the Association had been
deficient in maintaining the airstrip. This was the first time the Association had received
such a notice since entering into the Lease more than a decade before.
II.

The Course of Proceedings.
After receiving Sky Ranch's notice terminating the Lease, the Association filed a

peremptory lawsuit to protect its right to continue to use the airstrip. Sky Ranch responded
by filing numerous counterclaims and cross-claims. Seven years of litigation ensued. After
extensive and protracted litigation, including a number of dispositive motions, the issues that
were ultimately tried were relatively simple and straightforward: (1) whether Sky Ranch had
the authority to record the 2002 Declaration or whether the 2002 Declaration was void; (2)
whether the Association tortiously interfered with the legitimate business interests of Sky
Ranch by opposing proposed zoning ordinance changes affecting the Association; and (3)
whether the airstrip Lease was materially breached by the Association and then properly
terminated by Sky Ranch or whether the Lease remains in full force and effect. R. 746 at 2.
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III.

Disposition in the Trial Court.
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Rand Beacham sitting without a jury on

April 19 and 20, 2010. Following the trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the
Association on each of the issues tried. R. 746 at 3.
IV.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issue Presented.
The following facts comprise a summary of the trial court's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law entered on August 6,2010:
1.

The Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned Development is a planned residential

development near Hurricane, Utah, consisting of lots with access to a private, restricted
airstrip.
2.

The airport is the centerpiece of the Community and the primary purpose for

which the Community was built.
3.

In order to ensure the Association access to the airport, Sky Ranch entered into

a 99-year lease with the Association on November 25, 1990, pursuant to which the
Association became the "exclusive occupant" of the Airport.
4.

The Lease contains a termination provision, which can only be invoked after

the lessor follows certain specific procedures outlined in the Lease.
5.

Sky Ranch drafted and recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions and

restrictions for the Association on July 16,1990 (the " 1990 Declaration"), which superceded
a similar declaration it had previously drafted and recorded.
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6.

The 1990 Declaration allows the declarant, Sky Ranch, to amend the

declaration unilaterally during a specified period of time until 80 percent of the lots in the
Community have been sold.
7.

Any such amendment must accomplish at least one of three specifically

enumerated purposes: "(i) to more accurately express the intent of any provision of [the 1990
Declaration] in light of then existing circumstances, information or mortgagee requirements,
(ii) to better insure, in light of then existing circumstances or information, workability of the
arrangement which is contemplated by this Declaration; or (iii) to facilitate the practical,
technical, administrative or functional integration of any additional tract of subdivision into
the Community." R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27).
8.

In approximately June 2002, 75 of the 92 lots platted in the Community had

been sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the Community to 81.5 percent.
9.

Soon thereafter, Sky Ranch unilaterally amended and restated the 1990

Declaration.
10.

During this same time period, Sky Ranch had been laying the groundwork for

an expanded fixed base operation ("FBO") area within the Grassy Meadows community and
a new development ("Copper Rock") located adjacent to the community.
11.

Copper Rock had more than 1,600 planned lots and a 27-hole golf course.

12.

Sky Ranch wanted to provide access to the Grassy Meadows Airport to the

future residents of Copper Rock, despite the 99-year lease that Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc.
had entered into with the Association providing that the Association members would have
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exclusive access to the Airport and despite the 1990 Declaration, which restricted access to
the Airport to the owners of the up to 150 lots of the Grassy Meadows Community.
13.

To accomplish these development obj ectives, Sky Ranch included terms in the

2002 Declaration that were dramatically different from key provisions of the 1990
Declaration and added new provisions, none of which were mentioned, contemplated or
addressed in any manner in the 1990 Declaration.
14.

Sky Ranch also inserted a number of terms that deprived the Association of its

right to be self-governed by vesting control of the Association in Sky Ranch.
15.

The Association and its members resisted Sky Ranch's efforts to disenfranchise

them and radically change the nature of their community.
16.

Almost immediately upon the heels of the Association's and its members'

resistance, Sky Ranch sent a Notice of Termination of Lease dated March 31,2003 alleging
various breaches of the Lease.
17.

The Notice of Termination was the first such notice Sky Ranch sent to the

Association during the approximately 12 years that had passed since the parties had entered
into the Lease.
18.

The Association denied any breach of the Lease as alleged by Sky Ranch, but

nevertheless made concerted efforts to address the issues Sky Ranch brought to its attention
in order to attempt to appease Sky Ranch.
19.

Evidence presented at trial shows that the Association timely resolved any

maintenance issues that needed to be addressed and that it has always substantially complied
with the terms of the Lease.
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20.

The Association has continued to use the airstrip since the Notice of

Termination without incident or further complaint from Sky Ranch, just as it did prior to the
Notice of Termination.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration was void ab initio. Sky

Ranch no longer had the authority to amend the declaration unilaterally when it recorded
2002 Declaration. Additionally, the 2002 Declaration did not comply with the amendment
restrictions set forth in the 1990 Declaration, which require unilateral amendments to be
consistent with the general plan and scheme of the community. The 2002 Declaration also
constituted a brazen and improper attempt to disenfranchise the Association members oftheir
right to vote on community affairs. Because Sky Ranch lacked the authority to file the 2002
Declaration, it was void ab initio.
2.

Sky Ranch's claim for tortious interference fails as a matter of law. Tortious

interference is a tort that applies only to contracts entered into by third parties. Sky Ranch's
claim is based on a contract that it had allegedly entered into with the Association. Even if
Sky Ranch could prove the existence of such a contract, and even if it could prove that the
Association breached the same, Sky Ranch's cause of action would be for breach of contract,
not tortious interference. Additionally, Sky Ranch is immune from any liability related to a
tortious interference claim under the Noerr--Pennington doctrine. As such, the trial court
rightly dismissed Sky Ranch's tortious interference claim as a matter of law.
3.

The trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was not entitled to terminate the

Airport Lease Agreement. First, Sky Ranch failed to comply with the termination provisions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the Lease. Second, the Association substantially complied with all its obligations under
the Lease. Moreover, Sky Ranch failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings.
4.

The trial court properly adjudicated all the issues related to Sky Ranch's breach

of contract claim, including ruling that the Association was current in all its lease payments.
Even though Sky Ranch did not put on any evidence at trial regarding lack of payment, Sky
Ranch's counterclaim alleged that the Association had failed in this regard. Accordingly, the
issue was properly before the trial court, and the court was obliged to resolve the same. In
any event, Sky Ranch would be precluded from asserting lack of payment in a subsequent
action given res judicata principles and its duty to assert all compulsory counterclaims.
Thus, whether or not adjudicated by the trial court, Sky Ranch is precluded from asserting
this issue again all the same.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DECLARATION WAS VOID AB INITIO.

RULED

THAT

THE

2002

The trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration was void ab initio for three
reasons: (1) Sky Ranch did not have the authority to amend the 1990 Declaration; (2) the
2002 Declaration effected a drastic change to the character of the Grassy Meadows
community; and (3) the 2002 Declaration disenfranchised the Association members of their
right to control matters pertaining to their association.
A.

Sky Ranch Did Not Have the Authority to File the 2002
Declaration.

Sky Ranch's right to amend the 1990 Declaration terminated on June 11,2002. The
1990 Declaration allowed the declarant to amend the declaration unilaterally "until eighty
percent (80%) of the lots in the Development (including additional phases as may be added)
have been sold to purchasers." R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art., XII, § 3 (p. 28). The trial court found
this provision to be ambiguous because it was unclear whether the number of lots from which
the 80 percent calculation would be made should include only the then-existing lots or all
possible future lots. As the court explained "[t]he phrase, 'as may be added,' could be
interpreted to include lots (1) 'as are permitted to be added in the future, no matter how many
have already been added at any point in time,' or (2) 'as may have been added at any point
in time, no matter how many may be permitted in the future.5" R. 741 at 19, ^ 3.
The trial court concluded: "Because this language is susceptible to two different
interpretations, it creates an ambiguity in the contract that must be construed against the
drafter, in this case Mr. Longley [on behalf of Sky Ranch]." Id. at 14 (citing U.S. Fid. And
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Guar. Cov. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993); Culbertson v. Board of County
Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108, ^ 15, 44 P.3d 642). Consistent with fundamental rules of contract
construction, the Court interpreted this provision to mean that once 80 percent of the platted
and approved lots had been sold, Sky Ranch would no longer have the right unilaterally to
amend the declaration. Id. at lj 5.
Evidence introduced at trial showed that as of June 2002 only 92 residential lots in the
community had been platted and approved by Washington County.4 R. 741 at 4, ^ 18. On
June 11, 2002, the seventy-fifth lot had been sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the
community to 81.5 percent. Id. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the 2002 Declaration,
which Sky Ranch filed unilaterally on October 25, 2002, was void ab initio.
Sky Ranch takes issue with this ruling, arguing that the trial court failed to harmonize
the 80-percent limitation contained within the amendment provision with other provisions
of the 1990 Declaration. Specifically, Sky Ranch argues that the trial court's interpretation
of the 80-percent limitation contradicts an earlier provision stating that the developer could
amend unilaterally until its right to annex land terminates. Brief of Appellant at 17 (citing
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27)). Sky Ranch concludes that the only interpretation
that harmonizes all the provisions of the 1990 Declaration would be that the developer is
allowed to amend unilaterally until "it has finished developing and 80% of the lots are sold."
Brief of Appellant at 17.

4

Nor was any evidence admitted at trial showing that any additional lots were ever
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
platted and approved Digitized
thereafter.
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However, Sky Ranch's argument overlooks key language preceding the 80-percent
limitation, which eliminates any possible contradiction between the two provisions
addressing unilateral amendment. The introductory clause to the 80-percent limitation
expressly states: "Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary

" R. 375a,

Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 3 (p. 28). In other words, the 1990 Declaration specifically clarifies that
there can be no contradiction with the 80-percent limitation because the limitation is to be
read without regard to any other provision in the Declaration. Therefore, Sky Ranch's
argument that the limitation needs to be harmonized with other, would-be contradictory
provisions in the 1990 Declaration is belied by the express language of the declaration itself.
Moreover, Sky Ranch's argument betrays a fundamental misapprehension of the trial
court's ruling. Sky Ranch argues in essence that its interpretation ofthe 80-percent limitation
is better than "the trial court's interpretation" and must therefore be adopted. Brief of
Appellant at 18. However, the trial court never ruled which interpretation was the best
interpretation, nor did it need to. Rather, the trial court simply recognized that there was
reasonable support for both interpretations of the 80-percent limitation; hence, its conclusion
that the provision was ambiguous. See Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, \ 25, 190 P.3d 1269
("A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.") (internal quotations omitted).
Sky Ranch fails to explain in its brief why the trial court's allegedly less correct
interpretation was not at least reasonable. Indeed, the interpretation adopted by the trial court
is squarely supported by the express and unambiguous qualifying clause preceding the 80Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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percent limitation. Therefore, the trial court properly construed the 80-percent limitation
against Sky Ranch in light of the inherent ambiguity contained within the provision and
fundamental principles of contract construction.5
B.

The 2002 Declaration Is Void Because it Sought to
Materially Change the Character of the Community.

Even had Sky Ranch the authority to amend the 2002 Declaration unilaterally, the
amendment would still be void because it was contrary to all three enumerated purposes that
were supposed to advanced in order to justify unilateral amendment. The 1990 Declaration
allowed the declarant to amend only
(i) to more accurately express the intent of any provision of this Declaration
in light ofthen existing circumstances, information or mortgagee requirements,
(ii) to better insure, in light of then existing circumstances or information,
workability of the arrangement which is contemplated by this Declaration; or
(iii) to facilitate the practical, technical, administrative or functional
integration of any additional tract of subdivision into the Development.
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27). In other words, the 1990 Declaration prohibited
Sky Ranch from amending the declaration in any way that would "materially change the
character of the development." See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 6.21
(2000) (noting limitations to developer's power to amend declarations). Despite this
prohibition, this is exactly what Sky Ranch did. Far from more accurately expressing the
intent of the 1990 Declaration, the 2002 Declaration radically transforms the character of this
small residential community in a number of significant ways.

5

Sky Ranch clarified in the 2002 Declaration that the 80-percent limitation referred
to all "150 lots in the development," not just those currently platted and approved. R. 375a,
Ex. 6 at art. XII, § 3. (p. 32). That Sky Ranch felt this provision needed clarification by
amendment repudiates
its argument
the Law
provision
was Clark
unambiguous.
Digitized
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1

Greatly expanded commercial development.

It was i onlnnphlp'f IIOPI 'li«, U JMUMIII!' Ih.H Sk\ Kaikh would develop a limited
commercial area that would include things si id i as a Tixed base operatioi is' "' ("I TBO") area
for refueling airplanes and a limited number of hangars for aircraft storage. Thus, the 1990
Declaration stated:
Declarant may . . . conduct certain commercial operations on lands owned by
it adjacent to the airstrip, including, but not limited to, fixed base operations
for refueling aircraft and purposes incident thereto, construction and sale or
leasing of aircraft storage and hanger [sic] space, scenic tour flights and such
other business operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate; provided
however, that any such commercial operations or activities conducted by the
Declarant... shall be consistent with, and shall not unreasonably interfere or
restrict the Owner's beneficial use and enjoyment of their Lots or the
Property, as set forth in this Declaration.
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. VII, ;; h .p. 18) (emphasis added) I 'he key part of tl lis sectioi I ai id
the part omitted from Appellant's Brief—is the last half of the paragraph, which provides a
check on what would otherwise be close to unfettered power to engage in commercial
developn lei it ii I ai i/y n lai n iiei Sky R ai id i "deemfed] i lecessary and appropriate."
In a blatant attempt to circumvent m

^ \ :*-u

^

definition of "FBO" into ftle 2002 Declaration to include, without limitation, "facilities for
the sale i «nrpiane luel. a convenience store, lodging units ("casitas"), airplane repair
facilities, airplane waslnin' I'm itlifies and.ms udiurn lalcd facilities deemed appropriate or
desirable by the Declarant." R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. I, § u

; * ^nnh^s ^ a«i^-

addition to changing the nature of the limited commercial area contemplated by the 1990
laratK •-.."-. aaaing such things as airplane repair facilities and commercial lodging, this
d, : MM ., ii

. -. T-»I,M. a |j otl let Ilii i litatioi is tl lat pi e \ ioi isl> existed on Sky Kaiu Ii's power to
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engage in commercial development. First, it greatly expands the qualifying standard of any
proposed development from "necessary and appropriate" to "appropriate or desirable'' Id.
Second, it drops the limitation to keep business development "consistent with" the
Association members' "beneficial use and enjoyment of their" property. Id. Moreover, the
impact of this wholesale change is exacerbated by the reservation of rights section, which
states that Sky Ranch may wield its expanded right to engage in commercial development
in any way "Declarant in its sole discretion deems to be appropriate" R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art.
II (p. 6) (emphasis added). In other words, the 2002 Declaration makes it so Sky Ranch can
engage in any commercial development it wants.6
Other provisions further pave the way for a level of commercial development in the
community never intended by the 1990 Declaration. First, the 2002 Declaration greatly
expands the "additional land" that can be annexed into the development. In the 1990
Declaration, Sky Ranch delineated a small part of "Section 28, Township 42 south, range 13
West, SLB&M" as additional land that could be annexed. R. 375a, Ex. 5 at Exhibit B. In
contrast, the 2002 Declaration opens up all land in Section 28 as well as Section 33 for
annexation. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at Exhibit B ("[a]ny and all property . . . located within Sections
28 and 33, Township 42 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian").

6

Sky Ranch argues that it is "uncontested" that the Association agreed to at least some
of these uses in agreement signed in 1994. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only
did the Association contest that such an agreement was ever made, the trial court sustained
the Association's objection to admit a writing purported to be this agreement, as it was
unsigned, unauthenticated and clearly not final (there were markings and edits all over the
document). R. 754:104:15-105:6;
107:16-23;
113:16-18;
114:16-115:16;
Digitized by the Howard
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11lis land expansion would probably not mean much absent an additional provisioi1
Skv N!an< '» uUal slalinjj 11111 "IhtTi, r. no ifsfnclMiiiii u,"1iii,ilimi I lie iiuiiik'i of Iiaimai" and
commercial units allowed." R. 375a, Ex. 6 at XI, § 2(; i) (p 30) " ' I lie c< >n il )i I; iti< u i • >f these
two provisions allows potentially hundreds more commercial lots to be built on an increased
land area never contemplated by the 1990 Declaration. These provisions fundamentally alter
it: le nati n • = : of ^^|; ' I lat ^ \ as si ipposed to be a si i mil c on n i n u lit; ' vv ith a \ er> Hi: nited number of
owners having exclusive access to a private airport.
Transformation of airstrip character and role.
The _
• !()Luirs; •.

Declaration also broadens the definitions of "Lot" and "Member" to include
:

(nMin i

li1! I ' - M . I ' V o j i a r !

1 '; \(\ I '((> "k I hf\, n iiplai vulh Ihe

above-two provisions vastly increasing the total number ol pofn)tiiii n mo ITS allow.
potentially hundreds of additional people who do not even live at Grassy Meadows to use the
'airstrip. 8 This transforms what was supposed to be a private airstrip restricted to a limited
i in imbei c f i isei s into tl le sqi liv alei it of a gei leral a/v iation all port open to hi mdreds of
additional users. This also escalates maintenance needs for the airstrip, the re by c reating ai I

This not only directly undermines the lot limitation set forth in the 1990 Declaration
("150 total lots"), but it is internally inconsistent with the clarification made in the 2002
Declaration to the 80-percent limitation, which still presumes a maximum of 150 total lots
in the development. Id at art. XII, art. 3 (p.32) ("including proposed lots in additional
phases, or in other words, 80% of the contemplated 150 lots in the development").
8

Sky Ranch argues dial this change simply "clarified" the voting rights of hangar
owners as outlined in the "Phase 5C Declaration." Appellant Brief at 27 Sky Ranch's
argument overlooks the fact that the Phase 5C Declaration defined only the rights of hangar
owners in Phase 5C, not the owners of hangars located elsewhere in the development,
including the vast land expansion. R. 375a, Ex. 36 at § 3.
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impermissible increased financial burden on the Association, which is responsible under the
Lease for all airstrip maintenance. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 8.
3.

Introduction of jet aircraft into the community.

The 2002 Declaration also allows for the first time "the Declarant and any member,
or any guests and invitees of the Declarant or any member, to land jets and large aircraft on
the airstrip and park the same in the FBO area or on other property in the project." R. 375a,
Ex. 6 at art. IV, § 4(k) (p. 11). Indeed, the 2002 Declaration removes any restriction
whatsoever over the type of aircraft allowed to land and park in the community. Id. at art.
IV, § 2 (allowing "aircraft of any type or size"). Previously, the Association was able to put
appropriate restrictions on the type of aircraft that could land in the community.

R. 375a,

Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 2 (p. 27); R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 2.
The deleterious effects of this sweeping change are profound. First, jet engines are
significantly louder than propellers, prompting Sky Ranch to exclude the noise generated by
such aircraft from the Association's right of quiet enjoyment. Id. at art. VII, §§8 and 22 (pp.
22,24). The 2002 Declaration unilaterally waives this and any other legal right the members
of the Association "otherwise may have had against use of the airstrip by . . . jet and large
aircraft," including but not limited to any claims "related to any harm to person or property
resulting from . . . noise, noxious fumes, or any other damage or harm." Id.
Moreover, evidence introduced at trial established that the airstrip was not designed
for and cannot accommodate jets, which are substantially heavier than propeller aircraft and
require a much longer runway to land and takeoff safely. R. 375a, Ex. 16 (noting runway
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was insufficient in terms of strength, length and geometry to handle aircraft weighing more
than l(),00i! I'l'iiml* or " J I K I J P ',i i'l'hi t uh approach •pcctls ).
Needless to say; none of these pros JMOH\ mom K I HI ale! V expresses I lie intent nf the
1990 Declaration; rather, they effect a wholesale and illegitimate change in the nature of the
community. In short, the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was prohibited from
transform n it.1 nhal was nil ended lobe a small resident m I community with limited commerical
development into a bustling commercial 1 n lb \ v it! lhc tels, jet aire i aft, hundi 2 ::!s of additional
lots, hundreds of addition;11 (non-resident) airstrip users and whatever other commercial
developmeni Sky Ranch "in its sole discretion" saw fit to develop. See, e.g., La
T "whon'i* -/^v \'

, v t . Agency, ^ w r..

amended declaration allowing deve).»[*••/* ^

'

A n / . Apf

•* .

Esperanza

>X~r f • molding

-\ >i

designed for single family residences would upset "orderly plan" of community and was,
therefore, void); Moore v. Megginson,

416 So. 2d 993 (Ala. 1982) (holding amendment

allc wii lg ii icit isti ial vv arehoi ise ai id i i mil itenance facility in residential community was "not
in keeping with the area and neighboi hood" and I here Ion- \ OH! I, Realty t ' < nv/h Inw.stots
v. Council of Unit Owners, 453 A.2d 450 (Del. 1982) (holding developer's power to amend
declaration did tlot include power to change total number of units specified in original

C.

I h e 2002 Declaration Disenfranchises Association Mem bei s.

In addition to fundamentally altering the mature ol L U community, the 2002
i A , Lu ation amounts to a power-grab by Sky Ranch resulting in the disenfranchisement (>f
•-• ^ssoci; iti< >n's n: ien ii K :i : > 1 1 i< : 1990 Declarati< )i I designated Sk> Kandi .is the "'Class
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B Member" and all other members as either "Class A" or "Class C" members. R. 375a, Ex.
5 at art. Ill, § 2 (pp. 6-7). Class A and C members were entitled to one vote for each lot
owned by them, whereas the Class B member was entitled to five votes for each lot it owned.
Id. This ensured that Sky Ranch would enjoy a majority of votes for an appropriate period
of time to elect trustees and decide all other issues affecting the Association. E.g., id. at art.
IV, § 4(d) (p. 9); art. V, § 4 (p. 10); art. VI § 2 (p. 13); art. VII, § 1 (p. 17); art. X, §§ 2 and
10 (p. 23, 25); art. XII, § 3 (p. 27). Additionally, so long as it had Class B member status,
Sky Ranch had the power to reject any proposed amendment to the declaration adopted by
a majority vote of the members. Id. at art. XII, § 3 (p. 27).
Sky Ranch was to lose its Class B status and become a Class A member, when either
(1) the total number of votes held by Class A and C Members equaled the total number of
votes held by Sky Ranch, or (2) the expiration of 15 years after the 1990 Declaration was
recorded, whichever occurred first. Id. at art. Ill, § 2. This is a watershed moment under any
such arrangement because the developer not only loses control, but the vast majority of its
votes, as Class A members are entitled to only one vote per lot, not five. By the time Sky
Ranch drafted the 2002 Declaration, the number of votes held by individual members of the
Association equaled the number of votes held by Sky Ranch, and Sky Ranch had therefore
lost its Class B member status and accompanying control over the Association. R. 754 at
135:8, 17-22 (Mr. Longley testifying that he signed the Association's Bylaws, which
acknowledged that Class B membership had terminated on or abut June 16, 1994).
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1.

Resi

B member status.

Tl: ie2002Dech u i it i< )i icl langed; illtl ii; \ First: Sk> R ai ich asserted tl u ititnowhac 1203
lots compared to 77 held by the Association's members. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. Ill, § 2 (pp.
7-8). Sky Ranch could have only conic up with these numbers based on the altered voting
scheme il instituted simultaneously discussed below

M^ Kanu, men unilaterally declared

that "notwithstai idii igam ' statei nei it tl le Board of li i isi eesn my n< ive inserts :! intl le B> law s
to the contrary, Declarant has Class B votes as of the of execution of this Declaration."* R.
375a, Ex. 6 at art. III. § 2 fpp.
,A, K i. -.M«

'.

n

- K r- .iv\ M. .

Declaration, which unlike iln* 'o<

?>* Not onh v\.- (hi- statement conlnn

h- ih.

iLiiey signed m n i ^ i i . it was also contrary to the 1.990
- i .*

* -'on when '^ tin <ltiLiran«

could reassert its Class B member status once it expired. Compare R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. Ill
(pp. 6-7) with R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. Ill, § 5 (p. 9), To dissuade anyone from challenging this
i u lai ithorized actioi i, Sky R ai icl I i i u: thei declai ed: "It shall be cause far automatic dismissal
from membership on the Boai d of 1 11 istees of the^ ssociation foi boat di i lei i ibers to fail to
recognize Declarant's votes, including those held in trust for Declarant." Id
2

Altering voting scheme to retain Class B member status.

I la < ' ii lgresi irrected its Class B i i len lbei ship, Sky R anchthen sought to ensure that it
would never again lose its control based on vote totals

Sky R and i • ii I tl h • 1 >;; ' (1)

dramatically expanding the land area and commercial lot numbers of the Association, and
(2) expanding the definition c>f "I,ot" to include hangars, as discussed above in Part I.B.I.
A\ ownei nl ;ill these iuldilioii.il comriinvial and hangar lots, .>^ Ranch greatly increased
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its number of votes, particularly in light of the vote multiplier afforded the Class B member.9
Sky Ranch also extended the date when its Class B status will terminate regardless of vote
totals by seven years. Compare R. 375a, Ex. 5, art. Ill, § 2 (b) (p. 7) with R. 375a, Ex. 6, art.
Ill, § 2 (p. 8). By giving Sky Ranch hundreds of additional votes, the 2002 Declaration
ensures that Sky Ranch will always be able to at least out vote the residents of the
community, even after its Class B status eventually terminates. In this way, Sky Ranch not
only illegitimately resurrected and then extended its ability to veto any community rules or
declaration amendments passed by the Association, it ensured it would be able to exercise
control over the entire community indefinitely, thus rendering the Association impotent and
completely symbolic.
3.

Extension of Sky Ranch's power beyond Class B member rights.

As if unilaterally reinstating and extending its Class B member power were not
enough, the 2002 Declaration also gave Sky Ranch the right to promulgate and enforce its
own rules and regulations for the Association in perpetuity and "the right to unconditionally
veto" any rules or regulations promulgated by the Association for 15 years. R. 375a, Ex. 6
at art. IV, § 4(i) (p. 11) and R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. XII, § 2 (pp. 31-32). Although, the Lease
gives Sky Ranch, as Lessor, the right to promulgate rules and regulations affecting the
airstrip, no document prior to the 2002 Declaration gave Sky Ranch the power to promulgate
rules and regulations affecting the entire community. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 2. Rather, the 1990
Declaration made it clear that this right was within the exclusive province of the Association.

9

The 2002 Declaration also made it so that Sky Ranch could "vot[e] all or any portion
of [its Class C votes] as
Class
B Howard
votes"
its Law
"discretion."
375a,
Ex. BYU.
6, art. Ill, § 2 (p. 8).
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\u • • •

.

*reover th*

«• Declaration makes it so any rule

Sky R ai icl 1 adopts regardii lg the airsti ip w ill ti i n np ai p ' li iconsiste c: it i i ile < idopte :1 b> 11,: le
Association in perpetuity. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. XII, ;

• J±).

Similarly, the 2002 Declaration allows Sky Ranch for the first time to "charge
reason ah
/,/ ;w

amission arid other fees of Association Members for the use of the airstrip ,
•

,

-« rrr.*i.

.

,

i,

. i.cas^-

entered into with the Association, which set forth specifically what the lease p i \ in ti 11 ,s would
be and did not give Sky Ranch the authority to charge additional use fees. R. 375a, Ex. 1.
Sky I M

v nr-Mi i:: ,

seem^ va*ai :*..••.*•...••*
of the airstrip

iii^ illegitimate provision i\\ arguing: "While this language
-

^k"

' <*:

uii^- -/esi*' IK use

* Brief of Appellant at 33. In fact, there is nothing at all ambigiu m about

this provision, which specifically refers to "the Declarant," or, in other words, Sky Ranch,
i . iiIL in ; power

.

/5a, Ex. 69 art I V , §4(d) (p. •').

Sk\ Kaiuli ulmiiiainl uspown untbln liikTiu^tlic 2(H) 2 Declarauoii .\ nli a number
of provisions requiring the automatic dismissal of board members lor ;H

HI MIY \YII\

contrary to Sky Ranch's desires. As discussed above, the 2002 Declaration requires the
ai itoi i latic ciisi i Lissal of ti i istees for challenging Sk} is inch s unauthorized reinstatement of
Class B member status. It also ivquin s uiiloiiialii" di\imissal for (lir follow in< i ! i I'tiliny to
maintain taxiways (as opposed to the airstrip), even though the taxiways are privately • \ m • i!
some by Sky R anch itself, R. 375a, F \ 6 at art VI " ? 'n !<>;; ^2) refusing to sign Sky
R ( tiidi\ pn>posed"addei ldi n i il o the lease agreement
and (3) allowing lawsi lits I >y 1 1: le Associatioi I age L-: - s

: - \n. Fx. 6 at art V \ § 5 (p 10)
J: •:L >- \k-
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approved by a super majority of members. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. V, § 2 (p. 12). Sky Ranch
attempts to justify these extraordinary provisions by comparing them to in terrorem clauses
sometimes found in wills. However, there is a world of difference between a clause in a will
designed to prevent family infighting resulting from dissatisfaction over one's inheritance
and provisions set forth in a contract designed to chill a party's right to challenge illegal
provisions in that contract.
In short, the 2002 Declaration hijacked the Association's autonomy and made Sky
Ranch (i.e., Mr. Longley) the supreme overlord of the Grassy Meadows community.
Needless to say, this does not advance or more accurately express the intent of the 1990
Declaration—it undermines it. Thus, this further confirms that the trial court correctly ruled
that the 2002 Declaration is void. See Holiday Pines Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Wetherington,
596 So. 2d 84, 87-88 (Fla. Ct. App.) (voiding amendment undermining property owners'
"right of individual control").
D.

Sky Ranch Never Argued below to Have the Offending Provisions
of the 2002 Declaration Severed, Nor Is Severance Practical.

Finally, Sky Ranch asserts error on the trial court's part for failing to sever the
offending provisions of the 2002 Declaration instead of declaring the entire document to be
void. Sky Ranch is precluded from making this argument on appeal because it never made
this argument below. It is fundamental that, "'in order to preserve an issue for appeal the
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity
to rule on that issue."5 Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, If 15, 164 P.3d 366 (citations omitted).
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I lere til: M ti ii, ill < ; •< )i n I i ic :v ei I u i< ih u i< )j )j >c n ti it lit) I < : >coi: 1 ;i( lei 1 1 lis argument because Sky Ranch
m n t i n i n n l ill A u o n l n u ' h . Nk\ Kam Ii i . pivclud* il lh»m mining il here.
Additionally, if this Court were to sever each offending provision form the 2002
Declaration it would be rendered meaningless. See, e.g., State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d

J

i !%

( I I tail I 1999) (1 lolding provisions may not be severed if it w oiild render remaining provisions
ii loperable) ' I Il lis is i iota case for exai i lple wl lei eanoffei idh lg i 101 icon ipet = pi o v isioi t cat I
be severed from an otherwise enforceable employment agreement. Severing all the offending
provisions from the 2002 Declaration, which include the provisions governing membership
a-=r \ oiiim i sgi is among many other key provisions discussed above, would leave nothing
but,

•:: '

h-nliih

nil liii

• i >i 1111111 il \ • 11 nl JJ j \ II if • ni1 ni i) iiK.'iiiitniilul

guidance to governance of the Association. A s such, severance is simply not an option.
II.

T H E T R I A L C O U R T R I G H T L Y DISMISSED SKY R A N C H ' S CLAIM F O R
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE.
Sk> R aiich argi les til lat til le ti ilailli coi n 1: dei lied its di le process rights by dismissing its

tortious interference claim without an opportunity to be heard

Ii i i: eail it; > , til le ti h .1 c oi II il;

dismissed the tortious interference claim onl> after being argued by both parties at the
c< >nclusi( ni( )f ti: ial R 755 at 182:13 183:18; 205:8-206:9. The trial court had earlier agreed
to give Sky R ai icl: I ai lother da> (essei i:!:iaill;> ai lother cl: lane z ) to pi :>di ice e\ iiide it ice to prove a
contract between Sky Ranch and the Association "if'necessary"

Id. at 171:10--23 (eiiipihfis i s

added). The need to schedule another da\ of irial wis contingent on the court's rulings
relate* I to "the pi i:rl of Ik : trial [it 1 n id already] heard.
respective : { >n »{ x >se< Ifitu lit ig. , c »f i ) u ;1

-

..

/ v

\f er considering the parties'
. courl iullid thai it w a s
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"unnecessary to reconvene the trial to receive more evidence on this issue/' because the
Association could not be liable for tortious interference as a matter of law. R. 746 at 2 n. 1.
The trial court's ruling was correct. "It is settled that one party to a contract cannot
be liable for the tort of interference with contract for inducing a breach by himself or the
other contracting party." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah
1982) (citations omitted). Sky Ranch sued the Association for opposing a change in zoning
ordinances needed for Sky Ranch to expand the FBO area within the Grassy Meadows
community. R. 489 atfflf62-84. Sky Ranch alleged that the Association had previously
agreed not to oppose Sky Ranch's efforts to expand the FBO area. Id. at ^ 66-67. Instead
of suing the Association for breaching this alleged agreement, however, Sky Ranch sued the
Association for tortious interference of contract. No evidence Sky Ranch could offer at trial
could remedy this fundamental flaw. Accordingly, Sky Ranch's argument on appeal that
"the Association is attempting to avoid liability for breaching its contractual obligation . . .
," Brief of Appellant at 32-33 (emphasis added), is of no avail because there is no claim for
breach of contract at issue. For this reason alone, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
Additionally, a key element of tortious interference is lacking in this case even were
tortious interference the correct cause of action under the circumstances. To prevail on a
claim for tortious interference, a claimant must prove that the defendant interfered for "an
improper purpose or by improper means." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304. In light of this
element, Sky Ranch's claim fails on its face because the Association acted entirely within its
rights in opposing the proposed zoning.

Specifically, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

immunizes the Association
and its members from liability that might otherwise arise from
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; ;u on Dg the government, as in opposing zoning ordinance changes before a county
i .,!„„.i: ,

•

-/A-.-.

(holding developer's Un lions mlci
changes barred by Noerr-Pennington

. '.

^ s , 200-

ICIUKV

i hum brought ugitmsl

: •• *
MUIM

M

^P.3d323

itluak icsiM una zoning

immunity). The Utah Supreme Court explained:

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the
right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances." \T ~ CONST.
amend. I. In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court has
held that individuals and organizations are immune from liability under
antitrust laws for actions constituting petitions to the government. See United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed.2d
626 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. hroerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
• U.S. 127, 138, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed.2d 464 (1961). Over the years, courts
have extended this immunity doctrine, referred to as the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, see R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 420, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
120 L. Ed.2d 305 (1992), to "protect
political activity against tort claims
as well as antitrust claims," Searle v Johnson, 646 P,2d 682,684 (Utah 1982).
Id. at f 26; see also Kovac v. Crookec / Ri\ >e? Ri inch Clu b i im / ML h*:'** ';<
1197, 1200 01 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding homeowner association^ ,u . •< •

' *..
w ,J!,_

homeowner's application for a conditional use permit amounted to nothing more than
c oi istiti ltioi iall> pi otected participation in the political process and were therefore immune
from antitrust liability uniln flic V(«^' , -^"»//>!;/f»i | -1' »i;(" «> it, "K» /.cig/i burmlurt\

(>s7 I'.Jd

at 308 (reaffirming "constitutionally protected activity, like the exercise of First Amrndmenl
rights," absolves individuals o f liability even if the improper purpose/unlawful means test
is S<!lr-fk

Thus, evenhad the trial court ecu i II Milled so ine I. . IHIL al pan tslhi i l u i. m dismissing
Sky R a n c h ' s tortious interference claim before Sky Ranch had finished puttim
evidence in support of the existence of a contract between itself and the Association, such
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an error would be harmless given the above two reasons compelling dismissal of the claim
as a matter of law. SeeJonesv. Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp., 944 P.2d 357,360 (Utah 1997)
("Harmless errors are those that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood
exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.") (citations omitted).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SKY RANCH WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE AIRPORT LEASE AGREEMENT.
Frustrated with the Association's opposition to Sky Ranch's attempted power-grab

and commercial development plans, Sky Ranch sought to terminate the Lease. Termination,
or forfeiture, is a drastic remedy and consequently "not favored in the law." CommercialInv.
Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Cache County v. Beus, 1999
UT App 134, Tj 28, 978 P.2d 1043 ("Utah's courts have generally disfavored forfeitures in
landlord-tenant cases"); Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) ("The
undesirability of [forfeiture] is well-stated by the legal maxim that 'the law abhors
forfeiture.'"). The trial court correctly held that forfeiture was not an appropriate remedy in
this case for at least two independent reasons: (1) Sky Ranch failed to give the Association
proper notice of its intent to terminate the lease and (2); the Association substantially
complied with all its obligations under the Lease terms. Additionally, the trial court's
findings should be affirmed because Sky Ranch failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence
in support of the these findings.
A.

Sky Ranch Did Not Give the Association Proper Notice.

In order to avail itself of the drastic remedy of forfeiture, a party must strictly comply
with the contract's notice requirements. See, Siggard, 936 P.2d at 1109 (holding where
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

forfeiluiv i > ,i pn^sibk: remedy, person seeking forfeiture "'must comply strictly with the
n

,. s*

^(,7Y/iit .iiions om;: u'= Mui. (lie

.•« -

Lease required Sky Ranch to provide the Associationi wiih IIOIH t ot din .illlllt ""cd bin .idi .null
its intention to terminate the I.ease in writing and sent via "certified letter, return receipt
requested.* to each member of the Association's Board of Trustees. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 4. Sky
Rjtidi failed! In pu'Miil iiin CVHICIK'I <il IM.II In >he>\ lliiii il complied wi! • ns i -st basic
contractual requirement. R. 741 at 22, Iffi 20-21; R 7v| 7^S Mcciiiisc 1 i|,ih hi A iiiafiiiics
parties to "comply strictly" with all notice provisions of a contract, this failure alone confirms
tlle correctness <>i ilie ti i.ii comi s decision not to terminate the Lease.
;

T'

- -i.w'.> -i

.. .;

Ranch's notice was also deficient in udici I O I V .

AV\:U:\

s

coMirincd In U: fact that Sky
^

• * •• •

im

"forfeiture should be refused" when lU IIOULC I-, "indefinite or uncertain" as to the alle<.vd
breach that needs curing. See First Sec. Bank of Utah i> Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081
I °^;

!

** '•• • UIM •

\

i.1

., ^

v! not terminate the lease unless the

Association failed to cure the alleged bivarh ^ (thin wi n| »v o* lacing gium iiofin ol the
same. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 4, With one exception, Sky Ranch failed to give sufficlen
'i Hie Association in order to apprise it sufficiently what alleged breaches needed b_ bt
cured.10

Sky Ranch specifically asserted that the Association was not current on its lease
payments. The Association denied this allegation and Sky Ranch failed to produce any
evidence at trialDigitized
to substantiate
this claim R. 754 755
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For example, Sky Ranch alleged in the Notice of Termination (the "Notice") that "For
a prolonged period of time, Lessee has failed to maintain the airstrip and runway lights
anywhere near the same condition they were in when they were received, normal wear and
tear excepted." R. 375a, Ex. 2 at 1. Yet nowhere in the Notice does Sky Ranch allege what
specific maintenance issues needed to be corrected. Similarly, Sky Ranch wrote: "Lessee has
failed to meet the necessary insurance requirements as outlined in section 10," Notice at 2,
without specifying what specific insurance requirements it felt were lacking. Without
knowing exactly what Sky Ranch claimed needed to be cured, the Association could not be
expected to take appropriate remedial action, assuming that such action was even necessary.
As the trial court noted, "A cure period is meaningless and of no effect if the lessee is not
apprised specifically of the alleged problems that need curing." R. 741 at 22, ^f 23.
B.

The Association Substantially Complied with All Aspects
of the Lease.

Even had Sky Ranch strictly complied with the Lease's termination provision,
termination would still not be an appropriate remedy in this case, because the Association
substantially complied with all its obligations under the Lease. In furtherance of the policy
disfavoring forfeiture, Utah courts look to see if a lessee has substantially, rather than strictly,
complied with the terms of the Lease before considering termination. If the lessee has
exercised good faith efforts to comply with the Lease, the "substantial compliance doctrine"
instructs against terminating the Lease. Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134 at f 28.
The Cache County court explained:
[A]n overwhelming majority of courts [has] concluded, without reference to
a specific statutory
that
a Lease
may
not be
forfeited
a trivial or
Digitizedprovision,
by the Howard W.
Hunter
Law Library,
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technical breach even where the parties haive specifically agreed that "any
breach" gives rise to the right of termination. These courts note the
sophistication and complexity of most business interactions and are concerned,
therefore, that the possibilities for breach of a modern commercial Lease are
virtually limitless. In their view, the parties to the Lease did not intend that
every minor or technical failure to adhere to complicated Lease provisions
could cause forfeiture. Accordingly, nearly all courts hold that, regardless of
the language of the Lease, to justify forfeiture, the breach must be "material,"
"serious," or "substantial."
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
The court thus held that "a trial court should determine the materiality of the breach,
and then decide whether the breaching party had substantially complied with the [lease]."
Id. at ^ 36. Factors to be considered in determining the materiality of a breach are:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which
he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the
part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
suffer [from] forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 1f 37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 241 (1981)).
Applying these factors to this case, it is obvious that the breaches by the Association,
if any, were immaterial and not the kind that would justify the drastic remedy of forfeiture.
1.

Sky Ranch was not deprived of the benefits of its bargain.

The benefits to which Sky Ranch was entitled under the lease included lease
payments, having its property properly maintained and having its exposure to liability
mitigated through insurance coverage. R. 375a, Ex. 1, §§ 3, 8 and 10. The trial court made
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detailed factual findings supported by record evidence that the Association substantially
complied with its contractual obligation to provide each of these benefits to Sky Ranch:
3 3.
The Notice of Termination was the first such notice Mr. Longley
sent to the Association during the approximately 12 years that had passed since
the parties entered in the Lease, [see Longley Testimony.]
34.
The only other letter Mr. Longley sent to the Association
outlining alleged deficiencies regarding the Airport came one month prior to
the Notice of Termination. [Longley Testimony; Exhibit 273.]
35.
It was only after the Association resisted Mr. Longley's efforts
to amend the covenants, conditions and restrictions and zoning ordinances
applicable to the community to facilitate his Copper Rock Development that
Mr. Longley sent the Association any kind of written complaint about the
Airport's maintenance or any other issue pertaining to the Airport. [Longley
Testimony; Murdock Testimony.]
36.
The Association denied any breach of the Lease as alleged by
Mr. Longley, but nevertheless made concerted efforts to address the issues Mr.
Longley brought to its attention in order to attempt to appease Mr. Longley,
including replacing all broken lights, removing weeds growing next to the
Airport and addressing other minor maintenance issues. [Murdock
Testimony.]

38.
Evidence presented at trial shows that the Association
substantially complied with all the terms of the Lease.
39.
Although maintenance issues arose from time to time, including
at the time the Notice of Termination was sent, such maintenance items fall
within what would reasonably be expected as normal wear and tear of
improvements on real property of this type.
40.
Nevertheless, the Airport was always in reasonably good
working order and condition. [See Holt Testimony; McCarroll Testimony;
Habberfield Affidavit; Murdock Testimony; Batson Affidavit; Santosuosso
Affidavit.]
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41.
The Association engaged in regular and frequent maintenance,
and even improvements, of the Airport throughout the lease period, including
the following, among other things:
a.

added paint markings as an improvement to the Airport;

b.
funded an apron composed of crushed stone and sterilant
pellets to be placed on each side of the Airport for the length of the
airstrip to repair undercutting to the airstrip that had occurred;
c.
took measures to abate and remove weeds, including
spraying and cleaning the Airport in March, July, August and
September of 2003;
d.
kept the rail fences surrounding the Airport in good
repair, including repairing them after they were damaged due to a
lightning strike and automobile accident;
e.
kept most of the airport lights in good working condition,
including repairing lights on taxiways, even though not required to do
so by the Lease; and
f.
paid to have portions of the Airport needing attention
crack-sealed almost every year, including in 2000, 2001, 2002 and
2003.
[See Habberfield Affidavit at fflf 13, 14, 16-25, 33-35 and 38; Batson
Affidavit at fflf 10-18 and 21; Santosuosso Affidavit at fflf 6, 9 and 18;
McCarroll Testimony; Murdock Testimony.]
42.
Wayne Rogers, one of Mr. Longley's experts, testified that the
Airport had "definitely" been maintained. [See Wayne Rogers testimony.]
43.

Mr. Rogers also testified that:

g.
asphalt inevitably
environmental conditions;

shrinks

and

cracks

due

to

h.
the cracking he observed at Grassy Meadows was
consistent with an airport of its age;
i.
shrinkage and cracks by themselves do not indicate a lack
of maintenance but are just a result of natural aging;
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j.
he had no reason to believe that the weeds or drainage
issues he observed posed any kind of hazard;
k.
the Airport was in fairly good condition compared to the
other runways he has inspected.
[See id]
44.
Craig Ide, one of the Association's experts and the person in
charge of inspecting the pavement at municipal airports across the state on
behalf of the aeronautical division of the Utah Department of Transportation,
testified that the Airport rated a 69 or "good" on the Pavement Condition
Index. [See Exhibit 161 (Craig Ide Affidavit) at 1f 7.]
45.
Mr. Ide testified that the average score for municipal airports in
2003 was 59. [Id]
46.
With respect to the lighting on the Airport, Mr. Longley
conceded that the lighting system was a military surplus system, which he
bought on the cheap and installed himself. [See Longley Testimony.]
47.
All the evidence introduced established that, while the lighting
system was showing its age, it was generally kept in good working order—at
least in the same condition as when it was installed, "normal wear and tear
excepted,"11 as permitted by the Lease. [See Exhibit 1 (Lease) at ^f 8; Holt
Testimony; Batson Affidavit; McCarroll Testimony.]
48.
In addition to witnesses for the Association, another one of Mr.
Longley's experts, Ryan Christensen, testified that, although there were some
lights on the airport that needed replacing and others that needed cleaning and
polishing, the lighting system worked when tested and performed the function
is was designed to perform. [See Ryan Christensen testimony.]
49.
Mr. Christensen acknowledged that when he was deposed shortly
after inspecting the runway in late 2003 he testified that he "wouldn't be
concerned about" landing on the Airport at night. [See id.]

11

Normal wear and tear is a significant factor to be kept in mind as it relates to the
Airport and the lighting system in particular given the testimony of the harsh desert
conditions that plagued the Airport. [See Longley Testimony; Christensen Testimony;
Brewer Testimony.] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5 0.
There are no lights on any of the taxiways, except for those in the
FBO area owned and controlled by Mr. Longley. [see Brewer Testimony.]
51.
Any lights on the Airport that were broken in March 2003, were
subsequently and timely repaired by the Association. [See Murdock
Testimony.]
52.
At least one witness, a pilot and real estate expert who no longer
has ties to any party in this matter, testified that he inspected the Airport at the
very time Mr. Longley alleged it was in disarray and concluded that the Airport
was in good condition and decided to purchase a lot in the community based
thereon. [See Holt Testimony.]
53.
Another witness, a pilot with no continuing ties to any party,
testified that he also inspected the Airport around this same time and found it
to be in "very good condition." [See Brewer Testimony.]
54.
At no time have maintenance issues affected flight operations or
compromised the safety of those using the Airport in any way. [ See Longley
Testimony; Murdock Testimony; Brewer Testimony; Holt Testimony,
McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit; Batson Affidavit and
Santosuosso Affidavit.]

62.
Mr. Longley also asserted that the Association has failed to meet
the "necessary insurance requirements" outlined in the lease. Once again,
however, Mr. Longley did not specify what insurance requirements were not
met other than to assert that the Association failed to seek his approval and
provide him a copy of the policy. [See Exhibit 2 (Notice) at 2.]
63.
Once the Association was apprised of Mr. Longley's concerns,
it immediately made arrangements to have a copy of the insurance policy
forwarded to Mr. Longley. [See Murdock Testimony.]
64.
In fact, in his Final Notice, Mr. Longley states: "A mere
statement in Lessee's counsel's letter of April 15, 2003 that the required
insurance has been maintained and that a copy of the same is now belatedly
being provided, is not enough." [See Exhibit 4 (Final Notice) at 2, f 3.]
65.
Contrary to Mr. Longley's statement, providing a copy of the
insurance policy after being given notice of the outstanding need to do so is
precisely what is contemplated in the Lease's notice and cure provision.
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Moreover, the Association had little ability to cure its alleged failure to seek
Mr. Longley's prior approval of the policy until it was time to renew the
policy.
66.
There is no evidence in the record that the Association failed to
do this after being put on notice by Mr. Longley.

72.
Finally, Mr. Longley asserted that the Association's current lease
payment was past due, but no evidence was presented at trial and no mention
of any outstanding or delinquent lease payments was even made at trial.
73.
Despite the deficiencies in Mr. Longley's allegations about the
Airport, Mr. Longley sent a letter to the Association shortly after purportedly
terminating the lease, stating: "Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. [the lessor] has
no desire to prohibit lot owners [the Association] from use of the runway . ..
." [See Exhibit 283 (Duane Ostler Letter of June 6, 2003).]
74.
The Association thus continued to use the Airport virtually
uninterrupted and has continued to use the Airport over the past seven-plus
years without accident or undesirable incident of any kind. [See Longley
Testimony.]
75.
Mr. Longley has made no further assertions of breach by the
Association during this time. [See Longley Testimony.]
R. 741 at 10-17.
Despite this overwhelming evidence, Sky Ranch asserts that the trial court clearly
erred in finding that the Association substantially complied with its obligations under the
lease. In so arguing, Sky Ranch does not assert that the above findings are not supported by
sufficient evidence. Rather, it simply points to other evidence presented at trial that supports
Sky Ranch's position. However, this in no way demonstrates that the trial court acted clearly
erroneously in concluding that the evidence in support of substantial compliance outweighed
the evidence in support of material breach.
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Indeed, much of Sky Ranch's evidence of material breach is simply unpersuasive. For
example, permeating throughout Sky Ranch's case is the argument that Sky Ranch failed in
its "maintenance" obligation to repave the runway. E.g., Brief of Appellant at 34. Sky
Ranch thus argues: "The Lease did not provide for Sky Ranch to repave the runway—all
maintenance responsibilities were in the hands of the Association." Id. at 36. In fact,
resurfacing the runway is not included among any of the Association's maintenance
responsibilities. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 8 (detailing duty to "paint, level, compact, remove weeds,
repair and oil the surface," but not resurface the runway). Rather, the Lease designated
resurfacing as an "improvement," which the Association had the discretion to perform only
if it wanted to. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 6 ("Lessee may make improvements to the common areas,
such as resurfacing the runway

") (emphasis added). It is not surprising, therefore, that

the trial court was unpersuaded by Sky Ranch's arguments, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence showing that the Association complied with all its contractual
obligations to Sky Ranch.
2.

Sky Ranch did not prove that it suffered any injury.

The second issue to analyze in determining whether or not a breach is material is to
determine if the injured party can be adequately compensated for the benefits of which it was
deprived. As set forth above, however, Sky Ranch was not deprived of any benefit under the
lease. The Association (1) made all its lease payments; (2) maintained the airstrip in
significantly better condition than the average municipal airport; and (3) corrected the
clerical error resulting in Sky Ranch not being a named insured before Sky Ranch ever
incurred any liability related to the airstrip.
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In fact, the only evidence Sky Ranch put on in the entire trial regarding damages it
allegedly incurred was Mr. Longley's cursory testimony that he "spent about $12,000" on
cleaning up weeds and oiling fences. R. 755 at 22:16-20. However, Sky Ranch never
produced any receipts or other documents to substantiate Mr. Longley's testimony.12 Id. at
48:18-19. Thus, there is no credible evidence that Sky Ranch was harmed at all by any of
the alleged breaches. Moreover, even if there were, Sky Ranch could easily be compensated
for this loss by an award of damages. The availability of this standard remedy eliminates the
justification for the drastic remedy of forfeiture.13
3.

The Association would be damaged significantly if the Lease
were terminated.

The Association would suffer greatly if the Lease were terminated. The very purpose
for the development was to have access to a private airstrip. R. 741 at 2-3,fflf5-7. If access
to the airstrip were now denied, the sole purpose for the development's existence would be
eliminated, airplane hangars built by the Association's members would have no use,
transportation to and from the development would be restricted and property values would
decrease significantly. These reasons weigh strongly against forfeiture.

12

Mr. Longley initially claimed he had the receipts in a "file somewhere" but then
accused his attorney of losing them only to finally admit that he did not know where they
were—all in the same sentence. R. 755 at 48:21-23.
13

This is not to say that Sky Ranch was, in fact, damaged. It had the burden to prove
its damages with "reasonable certainty." Cook Associates, Inc. v. Utah Sch. & Institutional
Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284, ^ 36,243 P.3d 888 ("[Claimant] must also prove the
fact of damage with reasonable certainty, and the amount of damages may not be
speculative.") (citations omitted). Mr. Longley's unsubstantiated testimony fell far short of
this standard. Thus, this Court should also affirm the trial court's decision not to award any
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4.

The Association has already cured whatever minor
deficiencies that may have existed.

The question regarding the likelihood that the Association will cure its alleged
breaches also weighs against forfeiture. This case provides a unique insight into this factor
given that the Association has already cured all the alleged deficiencies. Indeed, Sky Ranch
has not alleged any further deficiencies during the eight-plus years that have passed since it
served its Notice of Termination on the Association in March of 2003. During this time the
Association has continued to use the airstrip with Sky Ranch's acquiescence as it did during
the 12 years preceding Sky Ranch's Notice, all without incident of any kind.
5.

The Association always acted in good faith.

Despite whatever deficiencies that may have existed in the Association's efforts to
comply with its obligations under the Lease, the evidence showed that the Association always
acted in good faith. First, it must be noted that whatever deficiencies that may have existed
were temporary or otherwise de minimis in nature. Moreover, as Sky Ranch itself noted, the
Association engaged in "frenzied" efforts to cure the maintenance deficiencies once Sky
Ranch brought them to the Association's attention. R. 741 at 10,fflf36-38. The Court also
found that the Association "exercised good faith efforts to name Mr. Longley's development
entity, Sky Ranch Development, Inc., as an additional insured in a timely fashion after being
notified of the fact that the entity, for whatever reason, had been omitted as an additional
insured." Id. at 16,fflf67-69.
The best evidence of good faith, however, lies in the fact that the Association has now
operated the airstrip for over twenty years without any incident being attributed to
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insufficient maintenance of any kind, and that with the exception of one brief period in
2003—at a time when the Association was resisting Sky Ranch's commercial development
efforts—Sky Ranch has never asserted that the Association's has been lacking in its
maintenance responsibilities or other obligations under the lease.
In short, far from clearly erring, the trial court correctly found that any breach of the
Lease that may have occurred was immaterial and that termination of the Lease would be
inappropriate in light of the substantial compliance doctrine. Cache County, 1999 UT App
134 at ^ 28, 35-38; see also State Dept. of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945
P.2d 676,678 (Utah 1997) ("An appellate court will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial
court sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). The trial court
also correctly held that Sky Ranch was not entitled to any monetary damages.
C.

Sky Ranch Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence.

Finally, Sky Ranch has failed in its responsibility to marshal all the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that "[a]
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). The Utah Court of Appeals has elaborated
on this requirement:
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal atrial court's findings of
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , the
challenger must
present,
in comprehensive
and
fastidious
every scrap
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of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." Once appellants have established every pillar supporting
their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings.
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'"
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Chipman
v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting appellant's requirement to
marshal all the evidence and then show that "the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable
to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support the contested finding").
In this case, Sky Ranch has only cited to the trial court's findings. Sky Ranch has
failed to marshal the actual record evidence supporting those findings. For example, as
indicated by the detailed citations supporting each of its findings, the trial court relied on a
number of affidavits and deposition transcripts admitted at trial, none of which were
marshaled by Sky Ranch. Sky Ranch has also failed to marshal other record evidence not
cited by the trial court that provides additional support to its findings. Because Sky Ranch
has failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, this
Court should not countenance Sky Ranch's argument that the trial court's findings were
clearly erroneous.14

14

For these same reasons, this Court should disregard Sky Ranch's argument that the
trial court blindly adopted the Association's proposed findings of fact. Sky Ranch failed to
marshal Plaintiffs actual proposed findings, which compared to the trial court's findings,
reveal no fewer than 42 changes made by the trial court. The changes range from minor to
major, and they all reveal the tedious process the trial court underwent in scrutinizing and
modifying the proposed
findings before adopting the modified version as his own.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ENTIRETY OF SKY
RANCH'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
Finally, Sky Ranch asserts the trial court erred in determining that the Association had

paid all the lease payments to which Sky Ranch was entitled under the Lease because this
issue was not before the court. Again, Sky Ranch's assertion is not supported by the facts
of this case. As discussed throughout this brief, Sky Ranch brought a counterclaim against
the Association for breach of the Lease. R. 489 at 5, ^ 16. In support of this claim, Sky
Ranch incorporated its Notice of Termination of Lease. Id. The Notice, in turn, alleged:
"Breach of section 3, lease fee. The lease fee specified in section 3 has frequently been
overdue over the years, and is currently past due." Id. at Exhibit 2 (R. 375a, Ex. 2 at 2, ^f 4).
That Sky Ranch failed to put on any evidence at trial in support of this claim does not mean
the trial court erred in adjudicating the same. Indeed, the trial court would have been derelict
in its duty not to resolve all the issues relating to Sky Ranch's claim.
In any event, were this claim not properly before the trial court for some reason, the
trial court's ruling would constitute harmless error given the doctrine of resjudicata and Sky
Ranch's obligation to assert all compulsory counterclaims arising "out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim." Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a).
The Association's Complaint sought relief under a number of different causes of action based
on the premise that it had not breached the Lease in any way and it was therefore improper
of Sky Ranch to try to terminate the same. R. 1. Thus, the issue of breach was squarely a
part of the complaint's subject-matter, and Sky Ranch had the obligation to raise all
counterclaims in response to that issue or waive the right to raise them in a separate action.
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Raile Family Trust ex rel Raile v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40, f 12, 24 P.3d 980.
Thus, whether bound by the trial court's judgment that the Lease was not breached for lack
of payment or precluded to raise this issue in a separate action, the effect is the same and
would therefore constitute harmless error. Jones, 944 P.2d at 360.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and
judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ c ? day October, 2011.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.

Gregory N. Hoole
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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know how to charge for the commercial areas and so forth.
Itfs just that we hadn't had any commercial areas, but in
!

93 we had a fellow that owned a lot out at Sky Ranch that

was actually an aircraft mechanic that wanted to put a
building up there at Sky Ranch.
I!ve never talked to you about this before, Craig.
And so he had a building that it's actually at the
Hurricane airport right now, and he wanted to put it in up
there, and so we started to get together with the board to
draft up these agreements. At the same time we did another
set of agreements, and these were all signed at the same
time.
MR. SMITH:

I guess I would just move for admission

of Exhibit 7.
MR. HOOLE: We object, Your Honor.
don't think is an executed contract.

Exhibit 7 I

If you look at the

signature lines, for the association it's written in by
someone, Al Conger or Paul Mathias or Mathis. And then if
you look through the document, it's red lined with all sorts
of corrections and annotations.
It looks like this was a work in progress.

In

fact, that's our understanding is that this was a work in
progress.

It was never a fully executed or even agreed to

document, so we would object on that basis.
THE COURT:

It is in the stipulated group.

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR

(435)

865-6895

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain
161 S. Machine-generated
200 W. Cedar
City,errors. UT 84720

104

4-19-10

030501171

MR. HOOLE: No, Your Honor. As Mr. Smith began to
talk this morning, this binder he thought contained a bunch
of stipulated documents. As Mr. Preston corrected him, it
actually has some that are not stipulated, and this is one of
them that we certainly do not stipulate to its authenticity
or validity.
THE COURT:

Can Mr. Longley tell us more about this

document that's here?
BY MR. SMITH:
Q

Can you just tell us more about this document and

how it came to be?
A

Yeah.

So then we started working on this.

It took

us maybe a year or a little less than a year, maybe a little
more, and it was basically drafts that went back and forth
between the board and myself.

And like I say, it had to do

with a lot of other important documents that they were
interested in getting, like water connections that I gave
them.

Also when we included the runway safety —

the 10-acre

runway safety zone at the end that I bought the property for
and everything.
Q

Did you perform your obligations under this

agreement?
A

Yes, I did.

And we've got copies of the notes and

the meeting minutes that show that this was done and approved
to be signed and so forth.

In fact, it was signed.
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you see that says (inaudible) board of trustees meeting
minutes July 9, 1994?
A

No, I didn't see that.

Let me find that.

You've

got those, huh?
Q

Look at Exhibit 201.

A

I see you guys have everything organized properly.

Q

Identify Exhibit 201 for us.

A

201 is one of the meeting minutes that reflect this

dated July 9, 1994.
Q

What's important about that date?

A

Well, it's a date when —

let me look at it a

second here.
Q

Let me have you go to page 3 of Exhibit 201.

A

All right, yes.

vote on that day.

This is when —

yeah, they had a

It was moved, seconded and carried —

MR. HOOLE:

I have to object on foundation.

The

first page of the exhibit says that Mr. Longley was absent
that day, so I think his rendering of any testimony regarding
this exhibit is beyond his ability.
THE WITNESS:

It says that I wasn't there at the

meeting?
MR. HOOLE:

That's what it says.

THE WITNESS:
MR. SMITH:

Yeah, I don't think I was either.

I just move for the admission of the

exhibit.
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1

going to work to put documents together in binders and all

2

that kind of stuff, and with some of the documents we could

3

stipulate as to authenticity to expedite things, but we were

4

reserving all objections on whether it be hearsay or

5

relevance or what ever.

6

many, many cases.

7

raise every conceivable objection to a document prior to —

8

even if they don't raise an objection, which we did, and no

9

court is going to allow documents to come into trial without

And Your Honor, Ifm sure, has tried

It's impracticable for an attorney to

10

some foundation that's laid.

11

this case, Your Honor.

12

MR. SMITH:

I don't think that's waived in

Your Honor, that's exactly what the

13

rules apply for, so we don't waste all this time laying

14

foundation on documents that there's no really real objection

15

to foundation.

16

THE COURT:

Well, there is a real objection to the

17

foundation for this document.

18

purports to be an agreement, but it's not signed.

It's not a final document.

19

MR. SMITH:

I'm not talking about that document.

20

THE COURT:

But you're talking about a document

21

you're trying to use to then provide the foundation for

22

another one.

23

they were entered that say this document with all this

24

scribbling on it is a final document or is an accurate

25

expression of the parties' agreement, I'll be really

It

If you can show me in those minutes even if
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And so —

MR. SMITH:

Can I read (inaudible), Your Honor?

THE COURT:

I donft know whether itfs appropriate

to do that either.

I!m looking at the pretrial order. All

it says is exchange lists of witnesses and proposed exhibits.
It doesn't say anything about objections.
MR. HOOLE: And why is it so, Your Honor?
MR. SMITH:
point.

Your Honor, we've already argued the

How many times are we going to argue the same point

over?
THE COURT:
that big a deal.

Calm yourself, Mr. Smith.

It's not

I don't see anything in the pretrial order

that cuts one way or the other on that.
THE WITNESS: We've got more stuff that show that
+- "In o +- ' o

o
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THE COURT:

So the answer to my question is nobody

is really sure where even there is an original of this
document, this agreement regarding development of FBO area
and other phases, with original ink on it.
MR. HOOLE:

That"s true.

THE COURT: All anybody has is a copy of what ever
that thing was that has been identified so far as not a final
document and not a legibly signed document.

You're referring

to page 4 on these minutes.
MR. SMITH:

Page 3, Your Honor.
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1

Your Honor, is that they did agree to an FBO improvement.

2

That's the assent that they were just saying never existed

3

and couldn't show.

4

That's why they don't want the document in.

5

It's right there in that document.

THE COURT:

It doesn't show that that document

6

existed.

It shows that a document existed.

"Provided a

7

current Attachment A is made part of the document and

8

provided there is at the end the landowners association

9

acknowledges responsibility," and I don't know if that

10

language is even in this thing.

11

tried to stitch these two document together?

12

provided there's added to the end of Paragraph 4, quote, the

13

landowners association, and there's an indication there that

14

says add sentence on draft page 3.

15
16

What about that?

Have you

The minutes say

I really don't see what this exhibit does for me,
Mr. Smith.

17

THE WITNESS: We have other documents —

18

MR. SMITH:

(inaudible).

What it does for you it

19

shows that back in 1994, eight years before 2002, that the

20

association was agreed to allow commercial use they now claim

21

is in violation of the CC&Rs.

22

THE COURT: Mr. Longley can testify to that from

23

his own knowledge.

Again, I'm not certain that this document

24

itself helps because this isn't the agreement.

25

something that might have led to the agreement, but this
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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It's evidence that they talked

There's evidence in the minutes, if they

were admitted, that they talked about and approved an
agreement if it had this and if it had that, and we don't
even have a draft copy that has the this and that from the
minutes.

So it's just not really connected.
MR. SMITH:

I withdraw Exhibit 7.

I am going to

move for the admission of Exhibit 201 because I think I'm
entitled to have that in evidence.
MR. HOOLE:

Same objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Don't we have anybody who can give us

foundation for minutes from the association?
MR. SMITH:
Honor.

Not unless they object to it, Your

That's why the rule says what it says.
TUT?
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because, again, I don't think it's a very practical
provision, and I'll tell you why.

It should be obvious.

The

way you employ that rule if you really want to be a pain or
if you want to get away with something is you file in
response to the rule 500 exhibits, and then give the party 15
days to respond or 14 days or what ever it is to make
objections to it.

It's idiotic.

That's not realistic.

People can't do that.

That's something some committee in

Salt Lake thought was a really snazzy idea, and it's stupid.
It doesn't work.

So now in this case what do we get out of
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I!m just not —

MR. SMITH:

If I would have known we were going to

3

have foundational objections, I would have noticed up

4

witnesses to be able to be here to lay foundation.

5

THE COURT:

6

testimony on other documents.

7

think Documents 1 through 35 and 202 through 319 and all

8

these other piles of them?

9

MR. SMITH:

We've already talked about foundational
Why were you not then saying I

I thought we were past that.

If I knew

10

they were raising foundational objections admitting some of

11

those documents, I would have raised foundational objections.

12

I thought we were past that because I followed the rule.

13

MR. HOOLE:

I'm not sure what his exception for

14

foundational objection.

15

objections except for Rule 402 and 403 (inaudible) unless —

16

MR. SMITH:

17 I . .

MR. HOOLE:

I know there's a rule that says all

(inaudible).
Excuse me,

Unless there a pretrial

18

order says differently or unless the parties stipulate to

19

admit.

20

MR. SMITH:

Don't say we stipulated.

(inaudible).

21

MR. HOOLE:

I'm not about to say that, Your Honor.

22

I know Mr. Smith is pretty excited about this, and my

23

apologies to the extent that Mr. Smith didn't understand that

24

we were reserving all objections, but we told you we were

25

reserving all objections with respect —
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about it, that he —
Q

That's fine.

A

A lot it was that.

Q

So your testimony is that 1997 creates the LLC

though had nothing to do with the filing of the 2002 CC&Rs
(inaudible)?
A

Absolutely not.

Q

If I can refer to the bylaws very, very quick.

have a blown-up copy here.
combined binder.

I

I believe they're Tab 12 in the

We talked about briefly earlier the changes

that came out of 2002 CC&Rs.
actually I take that back.

This is the recorded —

The bylaws have this

parenthetical here down at the bottom.

I understand the

association has been operating under those for years and
years and years that Class B membership automatically ceased
on or about June 16, 1994. Now, I will acknowledge that in
and of itself is nothing.

Is this your signature here on the

last page?
A

It sure is.

Q

Why did you sign it?

Why did you allow your Class

B votes to go away?
A

Have's you ever seen how big Al Conger is?

Q

That's all I wanted to ask on that question.

A

I objected in the meeting to —

Q

All I wanted to know is that your signature.
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see if it was safe and check out the runway lights —

well,

the lighting system came after that, but I had a couple of
things done.
Q

It's been a long time now.

And why don!t you go to Exhibit 207.
THE COURT: Were you going to offer 293?
MR. SMITH:

Yeah, we'll offer 293.

MR. HOOLE: No objection.
THE COURT:

293 is received.

(Thereupon, Trial Exhibit 293
was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. SMITH:
Q

What does Exhibit 207 show?

A

That's a very nice shot —

those are a couple of

guys I hired from Job Service to clean up weeds and probably
about the second day or third day.
Q

How much money did you spend to clean up the weeds

(inaudible)?
A

Between cleaning up the weeds and oiling the

fences, buying a bunch of oil or some of the oil and hiring
different people to come out there, I spent about $12,000.
Q

Go to Exhibit 208 and ask if you can identify that

exhibit.
A

Yeah.

That is —

these are pictures taken after

the other ones were taken because we had gone through and
cleaned it up.

See there's a guy walking down the runway
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1

THE COURT:

Well, I think that, Mr. Richards, is an

2

argument you can make just based on the documents without

3

asking Mr. Longley about it unless therefs some relevance to

4

his view of them.

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

stands for itself.

7

BY MR. RICHARDS:

8
9

Q

I will leave that as the document

You indicated —

I believe you indicated that after

the cure period expired, you hired some folks or gentlemen to

10

help clean up the weeds, and you paid them about $12,000; is

11

that correct?

12

A

No. .

13

Q

What was your testimony?

14

A

I hired about seven guys to help clean up the

15

weeds, and altogether with all the activities I did during

16

that period of time, hiring engineers and others, it cost

17

about $12,000.

18

Q

Do you have any receipts that would evidence that?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

(inaudible)?

21

A

No.

22

I don!t have them with me though.

I think they're in a file somewhere.

I gave them to Craig, and he lost them.

I think

I don't know.

23 I They're somewhere.
24
25

Q

I'd like to turn your attention to the insurance

policy that was discussed just a moment ago. We've already
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enough time to do it today.

If there's enough time, we can

push forward; otherwise, maybe we can come back on a morning
next week or so and do closing arguments.
THE COURT:

That's a possibility.

MR. SMITH:

We've got some —

I don't know that we

can get it done quite that quickly, Your Honor.

I'd like to

think we could, but I don't think we could, and I would
prefer just waiting until another day that we can come put on
our evidence on that.
THE COURT:
work up some —

Okay.

Then do you want me to try to

of course, starting with your proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, do you want me to do
those on the part of the trial I've heard, or do you want to
reserve all of that and have one set of findings and
concj-USions:
MR. SMITH:

I was going to say go forward.

MR. HOOLE:

I think based on evidence that's come

in, I would probably request submit a revised version.

But I

think I need to conform some of those findings that I would
propose to the Court based upon the evidence that's actually
been admitted so.
THE COURT: And then do that and then later try, if
necessary, the issue of damages and tortious interference?
MR. SMITH:

Tortious interference I think is in

play no matter what we do.
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1

was specifically provided in the declaration.

2

exactly what the restatement of property says in every case

3

that has applied to that restatement in a courtroom and has

4

come to the exact same conclusion.

5

That is

So we would submit, Your Honor, that not only is

6

the declaration void because of the unambiguous language that

7

says notwithstanding any other provision you can't amend once

8

you pass the 80 percent threshold, but the proposed 2002

9

declaration —

not proposed.

He filed it, and recorded it.

10

The 2002 declaration was so far removed from the original

11

plan and intent of that community that it would be void under

12

all applicable law.

13 I

Tortious interference was the next thing that I was

14

going to address.

There hasn't been evidence on this point,

15

but I believe I can make a brief argument by way of strict

16

application of the law as far as (inaudible) is concerned.

17

And the reason I think I can do this is regardless of what

18

testimony comes in as to planning commissions and what the

19

association did, the association is immune —

it's citizens

20 I are immune from liability for engaging in governing process,
21

engaging in local process.

22

clear on this point.

23

The Utah Supreme Court is very

To quote, the Court says, The First Amendment to

24

the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right

25

to, quote, petition the government for a redress grievances.
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In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court
has held that individuals and organizations —

and the reason

I emphasize organization is because I thought I heard an
argument in the restatement that First Amendment rights only
apply to individuals, but the United States Supreme Court, as
quoted by the Utah Supreme Court, says individuals and
organizations are immune from liability and from antitrust
laws for actions constituting petitions to the government.
And then the Court goes on and says, Over the years
courts have extended this immunity doctrine referred to
(inaudible) doctrine to protect political activity against
tort claims as well as antitrust claims. And this quote came
from a case where members of an association were getting sued
for tortious interference because they opposed zoning
ordinance changes, exactly what has happened in this case.
So we would submit summarily that even regardless of what
ever evidence is introduced by Mr. Longley, that claim must
fail.
Let me just now move to the contract that we've
heard so much about. And I want to emphasize, Your Honor, in
talking about the lease that we're not talking strictly about
a breach of contract here. What we're talking about, Your
Honor, is the termination provision, sometimes referred to in
the law as a forfeiture provision.

So what we're really

talking about is what is the proper remedy.
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1

say, well, hefd be in the position if he got the lease

2

terminated who else is he going to lease the place to?

3

a Mexican standoff, Your Honor.

4

and take it somewhere else and market it somewhere else. The

5

only people that he could lease or let use the runway are the

6

people that live.

7

doesn't have any way to do that.

8

Itfs

He canft pick up the runway

He doesn't have any choice on that. He

Okay, let's take a minute and talk about the,

9

quote, citizen's right of redress.

I think there's confusion

10

here, Your Honor.

We're confusing the fact that the

11

association last time I checked wasn't a citizen.

12

suing Mr. Ron what ever his name was that went out there —

13

you know, trying to stop this.

14

that evidence on.

15

haven't had a chance to put our evidence on about tortious

We're not

We haven't even gotten all

I think it's all premature because we

16 (interference.
17 I

But let me think.

Did we say anybody — again,

18

people can go do things.

I think I said this in my opening.

19

I thought I cleared this up, but I guess not. People can go

20

and exercise their constitutional rights. No doubt about

21

that.

22

Those people had (inaudible) agreement.

23

weren't in agreement.

24

heard is that there was an agreement.

25

say there wasn't an agreement, and that (inaudible).

There's Utah case involving Anderson (inaudible).
Now, they claim they

Mr. Longley the only testimony we
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he performed on it.
perform on it?

Did we hear any evidence that he didn't

Partial performance, we don't have to have a

written agreement.
Let's see what else did he say?

He said that the

head of the association came over and took his copy that was
signed and never gave it back.

I think that's called

spoliation of evidence in this state, but, you know, put all
those together.

Mr. Longley doesn't hold all the cards, and

there's not all of that sort of thing.
Now we have to talk about materiality of the
covenant defaults.

Let's talk about that for a minute.

First of all, let's read the lease the way it's written.

I

never saw any clause in the lease that said you only had to
maintain the airport to allow (inaudible) safe.

That's not

in the lease. Again, let's go back to the documents
themselves.

Let's don't spend our time making up language

that isn't there.

That's what's happened here.

They say,

well, we think it's quote safe, so no harm no foul.

We

believe the runway was safe.
Well, also they have two depositions in record, one
of Jesse Debusschere and one Nick Berg.

Both of those who

are residents of Sky Ranch said they felt that there was
problems with the lights.

The bigger problems they said they

sometimes shut off, shut on, sometimes it works and wouldn't
work.

And how much maintenance did we have of the lights?
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR

(435)

865-6895

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
161 S. Machine-generated
200 W. Cedar
City,errors. UT 84720
OCR, may contain

206

